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A False Sense of Security: How
Congress and the SEC are Dropping
the Ball on Cryptocurrency
Tessa E. Shurr*
ABSTRACT
Today, companies use blockchain technology and digital as-
sets for a variety of purposes.  This Comment analyzes the digital
token.  If the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) views
a digital token as a security, then the issuer of the digital token
must comply with the registration and extensive disclosure re-
quirements of federal securities laws.
To determine whether a digital asset is a security, the SEC
relies on the test that the Supreme Court established in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.  Rather than enforcing a statute or agency rule,
the SEC enforces securities laws by applying the Howey test on a
fact-intensive case-by-case basis.  This Comment takes the posi-
tion that policymaking by enforcement is harmful to the financial
technology industry and perpetuates the lack of clarity surround-
ing regulation of digital assets.
This Comment proposes a solution in which both Congress
and the SEC play an integral role:  1) Congress should amend the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
exclude “digital token” from the definition of “security”; and 2)
the SEC should issue an agency rule that creates a grace period
for digital tokens to become fully decentralized before the SEC
may evaluate whether they are securities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The more money we come across
The more problems we see1
Since the rise of cryptocurrency in 2009, entrepreneurs have
used blockchain technology for a host of purposes including execut-
ing contracts, raising capital, and performing secure business trans-
actions.2  The problem is that the traditional structure of federal
securities laws forces the otherwise rapidly developing financial
1. NOTORIOUS B.I.G., Mo Money Mo Problems, on LIFE AFTER DEATH (Bad
Boy Records 1997).
2. MOHSEN ATTARAN & ANGAPPA GUNASEKARAN, APPLICATIONS OF
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY IN BUSINESS 19 (Suresh P. Sethi ed., 2019).
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technology industry to a standstill.3  Congress and the SEC have
failed to provide the financial technology industry with clarity on
how the federal securities laws apply to the sale of digital tokens.4
Consequently, the SEC places sellers of digital tokens in a precari-
ous position of uncertainty as to whether they are in violation of
federal securities laws because the SEC sometimes views a modern
token sale as an illegal sale of unregistered securities.5  The distinc-
tion between a digital token and a security is significant because a
company that issues a security must comply with costly federal re-
gistration and reporting requirements.6  The SEC often pursues en-
forcement actions against such companies, and it justifies these
actions with:  (1) the traditional definition of “security”; (2) a legal
test unequipped to account for the dynamic characteristics of digital
tokens; (3) nonbinding agency-issued guidance; and (4) the SEC’s
purpose to protect investors.7  However, these justifications are un-
clear together and lead to inconsistent enforcement and uncertainty
in the digital token space.
Today’s widespread use of digital assets presents regulators
with a fresh opportunity to protect investors and facilitate innova-
tion.8  This Comment takes the position that Congress should legis-
3. See Part II.C.2 (describing the effects of unclear regulation in the U.S. by
comparing different outcomes for different companies).
4. See Report of Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 117 SEC
Docket 745 (July 25, 2017), 2017 WL 7184670, at 17–18 [hereinafter DAO Report];
Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, SEC, http://bit.ly/
2TpScJI [https://perma.cc/YZC3-T6P7] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) [hereinafter
Framework]; SEC. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
5. See Part III.A. (discussing the downfalls of the SEC’s current regulatory
enforcement procedure for digital tokens).
6. THERESA A. GABALDON & CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS 909 (2d. ed. 2019) (“Exchange Act compliance costs a company at least a
few tens of thousands of dollars annually in legal, accounting, and printing costs.
Beyond those expenses, a publicly held company has the annual fees of a transfer
agent and registrar and the costs involved with continued dealings with securities
analysts and shareholders.”).
7. See Part II.B (reviewing the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Howey test, and recent enforcement actions that cite the Howey
test—a common law test established well before digital assets were even possible).
8. See Financial Services Committee, Oversight of the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Wall Street’s Cop on the Beat, YOUTUBE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://
bit.ly/3gFY23U [https://perma.cc/RYM8-ACKD] (explaining that the United
States’s lack of regulatory clarity harms both companies and investors).
This company-by-company approach prevents regulatory clarity . . . .  For
this reason, although innovators are in America, and innovation is still
occurring in America, capital is fleeing—not to avoid our regulations but
to find efficient regulatory clarity—and they are finding it elsewhere.  We
need a simple set of rules that apply equally and clearly to all. . . .  Where
is the capital going?  Places like Singapore, the U.K., Switzerland have
laid out clear frameworks for digital assets.  Meanwhile, in the United
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late and federal regulators should initiate rulemaking to remedy the
regulatory uncertainty, rather than stand aside while the SEC regu-
lates digital assets through enforcement using a legal test and other
ineffectual justifications that were built for the analog age.9
Part II of this Comment will explain the technological platform
on which digital assets function and the characteristics and potential
uses for such a platform.10  It will then transition to the governing
law by reviewing the relevant provisions of the two major federal
statutes governing securities and the leading Supreme Court opin-
ion that establishes how to determine whether an instrument falls
within the statutory definition of a security.11  Finally, this Com-
ment connects digital assets to the law by demonstrating how fed-
eral securities laws apply to digital tokens and illustrating the
unintended consequences of regulation by enforcement.12  This
Comment ultimately urges Congress and the SEC to adopt a new
regulatory framework for digital tokens that would equally protect
token purchasers and issuers while allowing the industry to thrive.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Cryptocurrency Works
1. Blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology that operates on
a “peer-to-peer” network14 to which computers connect (“the net-
work”).15  The “peer-to-peer” terminology refers to the equality of
the nodes—the computers connected to the network.16  Nodes are
all equal peers to each other in that they all have equal access to the
data stored on the server and equally share the burden of providing
States, hundreds of companies await no-action letters, with only two hav-
ing been issued thus far by the SEC. . . .  Consumers and investors are
harmed by that status quo.
Id.
9. See Part III.B.
10. See Part II.A.
11. See Part II.B.1–2.
12. See Part II.B.3–III.A.1.b.
13. See Part II.B–C; Part III.
14. A peer-to-peer network is one that connects two users directly without
the need for a third-party intermediary.  Ameer Rosic, What is Blockchain Tech-
nology? A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners, BLOCKGEEKS, http://bit.ly/2ruWeWJ
[https://perma.cc/G6EE-ZKR8] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Rosic,
What is Blockchain].
15. Id. at 8.
16. Rosic, What is Blockchain, supra note 14.
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essential network services such as verifying transactions.17
Blockchain is analogous to a “global spreadsheet” as blockchain
globally stores data on the network and allows anyone on the net-
work to view a time-stamped record of network activity.18  Real-
time changes and modifications are visible to those who are con-
nected to the network.19
2. Cryptocurrency Exchange
Before one actor can send cryptocurrency to another, the net-
work must verify the transaction to ensure that no one modified or
tampered with the file.20  The network likewise must verify an ac-
tor’s identity to prevent fraudulent use of another’s payment infor-
mation.21  Verifying a transaction requires algorithms to solve a
series of extraordinarily complex mathematical problems.22  Any
17. Id.  In an open blockchain, access to the internet is the only requirement
for a node to view the network data. ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING
BITCOIN 139 (Mike Loukides & Allyson MacDonald eds., 1st ed. 2014).
18. MINGXING XU, YING TIAN, & JIYUE LI, BLOCKCHAIN: AN ILLUSTRATED
GUIDEBOOK TO UNDERSTANDING BLOCKCHAIN 41 (Jie Liu trans., 2018). See also
ETHERSCAN, http://bit.ly/2CBtCxA [https://perma.cc/3S35-WX3S] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2020) (providing an example of blockchain).
19. XU, supra note 18, at 18 (“Once the ledger is altered, the modification of
all replica data will be completed in minutes or even seconds.  Every transaction in
distributed ledgers has a unique timestamp to avoid duplicate payment.”).
20. See haseebrabbani, What is Hashing & Digital Signature in the
Blockchain?, BLOCKGEEKS (Oct. 12, 2017, 12:24 PM), http://bit.ly/2q2JxlM [https://
perma.cc/PM9B-F7Z2].  Every new block must obtain a unique hash (signature),
which is created by a cryptographic hash function, a formula that transforms input
data into a “unique 64-digit string of output.”  Jimi S., How Does Blockchain Work
in 7 Steps — A Clear and Simple Explanation, GOOD AUDIENCE BLOG (May 6,
2018), http://bit.ly/2CArBS4 [https://perma.cc/8B3X-95DT].  Each signature must
comply with the blockchain’s requirements. Id.  For example, a blockchain could
require each new signature to begin with ten consecutive zeroes. Id. Miners use
their computer power to verify transactions by running software that uses trial and
error to find a valid signature for a new block. IMRAN BASHIR, MASTERING
BLOCKCHAIN: DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY, DECENTRALIZATION, AND
SMART CONTRACTS EXPLAINED 167–68 (2d. ed. 2018).  As the quantity of zeroes
that a signature requires increases, the amount of computer power necessary to
validate the transaction also increases; thus, a signature that requires a greater
quantity of zeroes is very difficult to verify. Id. at 167–172.  For a simple example
of the effects of increasing difficulty, see Kiran Vaidya, Decoding the Enigma of
Bitcoin Mining—Part I: Mechanism, MEDIUM BLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), https://bit.ly/
3g19nLs [https://perma.cc/964C-CUN7].
21. See Why Has My ID Submission Been Rejected?, BLOCKCHAIN SUPPORT,
http://bit.ly/2O2K0MH [https://perma.cc/Y2RZ-4KQB] (last visited Sept. 18,
2020).
22. See Eric Rykwalder, The Math Behind Bitcoin, COINDESK (Oct. 19, 2014,
1:08 PM), http://bit.ly/2pTbTPv [https://perma.cc/Z6XN-F67Y ] (explaining private
and public keys, the formulas involved in each, and how they secure cryptocur-
rency).  The odds of solving one of these problems on the Bitcoin network were
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node with enough processing power can verify a transaction.23
Miners24 attempt to verify transactions and earn a small transaction
fee for successfully doing so.25  Further, public-private key encryp-
tion allows a sender of cryptocurrency to ensure that only the in-
tended recipient can decrypt messages.26
Once the network validates the transaction and the actor’s
identity, the network groups the verified transaction with other ver-
ified transactions to create a “block.”27  The network then attaches
the block to the existing “chain” in the network, hence the title
“blockchain.”28  At a minimum, a blockchain will record and add to
about 1 in 17.6 trillion in September 2020. Difficulty, BTC.COM, https://bit.ly/
2BDyipq [https://perma.cc/TM83-QPV7] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (graphing the
current height of the Bitcoin blockchain and the measure of how difficult it is to
mine a Bitcoin block, among other statistics).
23. BASHIR, supra note 20, at 167, 173–74.  Verification does not require the
efforts of every computer on the network. See id. at 167–68 (describing the mining
process).  Such a requirement would heavily burden the verification process and
destroy blockchain’s efficiency.  Instead, once the mining nodes successfully verify
a transaction and add a new block to the chain, all computers on the network can
view the new addition and all transaction history in real time. XU, supra note 18,
at 39.  The opportunity to earn transaction fees is the reason miners purchased
unprecedented quantities of graphics cards and customized hardware in 2018—to
multiply their computer processing power and consequently increase their com-
puters’ capacities to verify transactions.  Tom Warren, Bitcoin Mania is Hurting PC
Gamers by Pushing Up GPU Prices, THE VERGE (Jan. 30, 2018, 7:42 AM), https://
bit.ly/3d93daX.  Increase in demand and product shortages caused graphics card
prices to nearly double. Id. (“[P]ricing for Nvidia’s GeForce GTX 1070 should be
around $380 . . . but . . . some cards are now being sold for more than $700 due to
the stock shortages—an increase of more than 80 percent.”).
24. Miners are network participants who solve mathematical problems to cre-
ate the next “block” on the ledger of transactions. ISHAN ROY, BLOCKCHAIN DE-
VELOPMENT FOR FINANCE PROJECTS loc. Sec. 1, Chapter 4 (Packt Publishing 2020)
(ebook). See also Jimi S., supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining how
miners verify transactions).
25. BASHIR, supra note 20, at 168; see, e.g., Predicting Bitcoin Fees for Trans-
actions, EARN, http://bit.ly/2p8kSf3 [https://perma.cc/8ZYX-W4Q3] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2020) (explaining that, in September 2020, “the fastest and cheapest
transaction fee [for Bitcoin] . . . [was] 120 satoshis/byte”).  A satoshi is the smallest
unit of Bitcoin and is equivalent to a 100 millionth of a bitcoin.  Jake Frankenfield,
Satoshi, INVESTOPEDIA (June 27, 2020), http://bit.ly/33PCPOs [https://perma.cc/
CZ5Y-GM65].
26. PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW:
THE RULE OF CODE (2018) 14–16.
27. Id. at 22. Verified transactions are grouped together to form a single
block (“Bundles of . . . transactions are grouped together into separate ‘blocks,’
which Bitcoin’s protocol links together to form a sequential, timestamped
‘chain.’”).
28. See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
SYSTEM 7 (2008), http://bit.ly/2QadxVL [https://perma.cc/RG7E-NNHX] (referring
to the distributed ledger as “a chain of blocks”).
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the “digital spreadsheet” the hash29 and size of a newly created
block, the amount of currency involved in an exchange, the miner
who successfully verified a transaction,30 and the blockchain’s new
total height.31
a. Digital Tokens versus Digital Coins
Though Bitcoin was the first and most widely-known digital
coin, thousands of different cryptocurrencies exist on the market,
and more cryptocurrenices are introduced to the market nearly
every day.32  In the span of only ten months between October 2019
and September 2020, the quantity of cryptocurrencies on the mar-
ket more than tripled, averaging 15 new cryptocurrencies per day.33
In ordinary language, the words “token” and “coin” both de-
scribe a valuable object that is exchangeable for a good or service.34
However, in the context of digital assets, these two terms are not
interchangeable.35  A digital coin is an asset that is native to its own
blockchain and resembles cash in that users can use digital coins to
make payments.36  However, developers can contrive digital assets
to function more complexly than typical payment methods.37  De-
29. A hash is a block’s unique identifier or “digital signature.” ARVIND
MATHARU, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCIES 12 (2019). See also Jimi S.,
supra note 20.
30. See Jimi S., supra note 20.
31. See ETHERSCAN, supra note 18.  Blockchain increases in “height” as the
network adds new blocks. Id. To view an example of a block height, see Block
#10616540, ETHERSCAN, https://bit.ly/2DH5b5E [https://perma.cc/B429-ZUNT]
(last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
32. See Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization, COINMARKET-
CAP, http://bit.ly/32BL0g0 [https://perma.cc/LUH4-634G] (last visited Sept. 18,
2020) (listing Bitcoin as the number one cryptocurrency by market capitalization);
Ameer Rosic, What Is Cryptocurrency? [Everything You Need to Know!],
BLOCKGEEKS, http://bit.ly/2CENQq0 [https://perma.cc/SRT4-ER86] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2020).
33. See COINMARKETCAP, supra note 32 (listing 7,106 cryptocurrencies as of
September 18, 2020).  In October 2019, CoinMarketCap listed 2,069 cryptocur-
rencies. Id.
34. Token, LEXICO, http://bit.ly/2RsQI1j [https://perma.cc/93GP-B2RS] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2020); Coin, LEXICO, http://bit.ly/2GssVbz [https://perma.cc/
AR74-B34N] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
35. Citowise, The Basics: Coin vs. Token. What Is the Difference?, MEDIUM
BLOG (Jan. 22, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Kbi0W9 [https://perma.cc/M8T7-HHME].
36. Id. Bitcoin was the first digital coin. Id. Bitcoin owners can pay others
and accept payment from others in Bitcoin. Id.  AT&T became the first mobile
carrier to accept online phone bill payments in cryptocurrency.  Kathleen Joyce,
AT&T Says It Will Accept Payments in Cryptocurrency, FOXBUSINESS (May 24,
2019), https://fxn.ws/2NAVOH5 [https://perma.cc/TVD8-KQA7].  Microsoft, Over-
stock.com, Nordstrom, Whole Foods, and GameStop also accept payments in
cryptocurrency. Id.
37. ATTARAN, supra note 2, at 17–19 (2019).
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velopers can attach any sort of value to a digital token, including
access to a gaming license or document, voting rights, or the ability
to partake in an activity.38
3. Characteristics of Blockchain
Three unique characteristics of blockchain make it particularly
attractive to users:  1) decentralization, 2) security, and 3)
efficiency.39
a. Decentralization
In a centralized system, users depend on a single authority to
fully control and manage all data on the network.40  If a centralized
server crashes, users will be unable to access the data, and if a
hacker breaches the centralized server, all data is compromised.
Most online service providers use centralized servers, including
Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, and YouTube, which is why
each of these providers adopts a privacy policy to explain to users
how the central authority manages users’ data.41  On the contrary,
blockchain is a decentralized system.42  The adjective “decentral-
ized” describes the independent nature of the peer-to-peer net-
work.43  Unlike the network in a centralized system, a blockchain
has no central authority that single-handedly owns, controls, and
manages network data.44  A blockchain also does not store its data
in a single location.  Instead, it distributes its data and provides
equal access to network data to all computers on the network.45
For these reasons, blockchain is a true “democratized system.”46
38. Tim Falk, The Difference Between Cryptocurrency Coins and Tokens,
FINDER (Mar. 14, 2019), http://bit.ly/32yPHY9 [https://perma.cc/DC69-RMA8].
39. BASHIR, supra note 20, at 24–25.
40. DE FILIPPI, supra note 26, at 55–56 (“Today, algorithms are centrally con-
trolled, deployed[,] and stewarded by online intermediaries, which . . . retain con-
trol over these algorithms and the power to tweak them or shut them off if
necessary.”).
41. BASHIR, supra note 20, at 44.
42. ARVIND MATHARU, UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCIES 17 (2019).
The “decentralized” characteristic of blockchain is significant to this Comment’s
proposed regulatory scheme. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
43. See BASHIR, supra note 20, at 44 (“A decentralized system is a type of
network where nodes are not dependent on a single master node; instead, control
is distributed among many nodes.”).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Rosic, What is Blockchain, supra note 14.
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b. Security
Blockchain transactions are highly secure because no single
person or entity owns a blockchain, and a blockchain has no central
control room from which a person can alter or control the ledger.47
Unlike a centralized network,48 the decentralized network distrib-
utes to each computer a real-time copy of the chain as it expands
and transforms.49  Further, once the network verifies a transaction,
creates a block, and adds the block to the chain, the network assigns
a “hash” to the block.50  The hash is comparable to a digital finger-
print in that no two hashes are identical.51  The new block records
both its own hash and the previous block’s hash to which the new
block attaches, thus creating an unbreakable chain of entirely
unique blocks.52  Even a slight alteration to a single block’s hash
will alter each of the connected blocks’ hashes.53  When a user al-
ters a block, the altered block detaches from the chain and immedi-
ately notifies the network of the modification, causing the network
to automatically reject the alteration.54  To hack or otherwise alter a
blockchain, a hacker would have to obtain enough computing
power to outnumber all other network participants.55  The inability
to alter a block is referred to as “immutability.”56
c. Efficiency
Finally, cryptocurrency transactions on the blockchain can be
far more efficient than alternatives such as wire transfers and credit
card transactions.57  Wire transfers that involve more than one type
47. See Jimi S., supra note 20.
48. Supra Part II.A.3.a (“[I]f a hacker breaches the [centralized] server, all
data is compromised.”).
49. XU, supra note 18, at 39; Jimi S., supra note 20.  To successfully alter one
block, a hacker would have to keep the block attached to the chain by rapidly
assigning new hashes to each block on the chain.  Jimi S., supra note 20.  This task
would be possible only if the hacker possessed more computing power than the
aggregate of the other computers on the network. Id.
50. Jimi S., supra note 20.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. XU, supra note 18, at 29; accord Rosic, What is Blockchain, supra note 14.
This consequence is fittingly called the “Avalanche Effect.”  Rosic, What is
Blockchain, supra note 14.
54. See Jimi S., supra note 20.
55. See DE FILIPPI, supra note 26, at 113 (reporting the cost of performing a
51% attack as more than $1 billion in 2018).  Recall there can be thousands of
computers in the network.  Jimi S., supra note 20.
56. ATTARAN, supra note 2, at 13.
57. Lori Tripoli, Regulators Wary of Crypto as Digital Assets Go Mainstream,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 20, 2019, 3:57 PM), http://bit.ly/34L7mwQ [https://
perma.cc/68ML-G779].
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of currency illustrate the benefits to utilizing blockchain.58  In such
transactions, parties often must use banks to convert one currency
to another currency and thus must complete transactions within
normal banking hours.59  Working within business hours can be par-
ticularly problematic when parties transfer money from one time
zone to another.60  On the contrary, a transfer of cryptocurrency
does not require any conversions and will transfer instantaneously
without time-of-day restrictions.61
4. Other Applications of Blockchain
The financial technology industry is just one of the countless
industries that uses blockchain technology.62  Blockchain’s decen-
tralization, security, and efficiency attract a variety of markets to
utilize blockchain for purposes such as smart contracts63, supply
chain management64, and voting.65
Ethereum is a “programmable blockchain” that allows devel-
opers to write code to control the exchange of their cryptocur-
rency.66  Users can create “smart contracts”:  contracts which “self-
execute the stipulations of an agreement when predetermined con-
ditions are triggered.”67  The parties to the contract agree on the
terms and conditions that will trigger execution of the contract and
write them into the code, and the network records the details of the
smart contract on the blockchain.68  For example, the French airline
AXA began using smart contracts in 2018 to distribute flight-delay
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Scott D. Hughes, Cryptocurrency Regulations and Enforcement in the
U.S., 45 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017); see also Speech, Bill Hinman, Dir. of Div. of
Corp. Fin., SEC, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)
(June 14, 2018), https://bit.ly/3fF6OOc [https://perma.cc/4Q3F-TWEM] [hereinaf-
ter Hinman Speech].
63. XU, supra note 18, at 55–57.
64. Id. at 82.
65. Id. at 73; see also FOLLOW MY VOTE, http://bit.ly/34PAR0J [https://
perma.cc/C6EC-B5H5] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020) (“Using the unparalleled secur-
ity of blockchain technology, we are poised to disrupt the established voting indus-
try by offering a more cost-effective and technologically superior solution.”).
66. See generally ETHEREUM, http://bit.ly/2Q9SVyO [https://perma.cc/34MH-
KSWT] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
67. See id.; Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the
Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 179 (2017).
68. Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain Technology That Will Re-
place Lawyers, BLOCKGEEKS, http://bit.ly/2Kb5fuL [https://perma.cc/VLW8-
Q8DV] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
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insurance payouts to flight insureds.69  For AXA, a flight delay of
two hours or more is the predetermined condition that triggers exe-
cution of the smart contract.70  The smart contract receives informa-
tion from global air traffic databases and automatically initiates
payment to insureds once the blockchain registers a two-hour
delay.71
In light of recent food-borne illnesses and contamination out-
breaks, Walmart now uses blockchain technology to trace the origin
and processing steps of food inventory, including fresh meat and
vegetables.72  Farmers and food suppliers enter data about the food
into the blockchain database so Walmart can, in a matter of
seconds, precisely pinpoint when food will spoil or which food is at
risk of contamination during a food-borne illness outbreak.73
Walmart estimates that its new ability to better manage the shelf
life of its products will save it billions of dollars.74
Finally, Follow My Vote utilizes blockchain technology and
cryptography to create an anonymous, fraud-proof, and transparent
online voting platform where voters can “independently audit the
ballot box.”75  Each vote is a transaction on the blockchain that re-
quires verification by the network.76
B. Transformation of U.S. Securities Laws
Understanding all intricacies of federal securities laws is be-
yond the scope of this Comment.  However, an overview of the first
major securities laws, the controlling Supreme Court case, and a
few recent SEC actions illustrate the process by which regulators
apply traditional securities laws to cryptocurrency.
69. Maria Terekhova, AXA Turns to Smart Contracts for Flight-Delay Insur-
ance, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 15, 2017, 9:48 AM), http://bit.ly/2QjldXJ [https://
perma.cc/5R64-BS2Z].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain:
Walmart Tracks Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2X8XBGC
[https://perma.cc/F5RL-8Z9B] (raising questions about the necessity of a distrib-
uted database when Walmart already stores all of its blockchain records on IBM’s
cloud).  A major benefit of blockchain technology is that it removes the need for a
third-party intermediary, but IBM is serving as such by hosting the data on its
cloud. Id.
73. See id.
74. XU, supra note 18, at 82.
75. FOLLOW MY VOTE, http://bit.ly/34PAR0J [https://perma.cc/C6EC-B5H5]
(last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
76. Blockchain Technology in Online Voting, FOLLOW MY VOTE, http://bit.ly/
32CHfqL [https://perma.cc/VVL7-XF6H] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
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1. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities
Act”)77 and its sister statute, the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (“the Exchange Act”),78 to protect investors.79  The Securities
Act, often referred to as the “Truth in Securities Act,” regulates the
issuance of securities while the Exchange Act regulates the trading
of securities on the secondary market.80  The Securities Act defines
the term “security” broadly to include stocks, bonds, profit-sharing
interests, and the ambiguous catch-all term, “investment con-
tracts.”81  Companies that sell securities to the public must register
their securities with the SEC.82  These registration requirements
oblige the issuing company to publish information about the com-
pany and the securities it offers for sale to allow investors to make
informed investment decisions.83  A company that sells unregis-
tered securities violates the Securities Act, but notably, only the of-
fering of a security will trigger the registration requirements.84
Because of the serious legal implications of selling unregistered se-
curities, parties wishing to issue digital tokens frequently contend
with whether a digital token is a security.
77. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2018).
78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–qq.
79. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (“[T]he Commission shall
. . . consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm, 78a–qq (2018).  This Comment discusses SEC en-
forcement actions against companies for perceived violations of the Securities Act
rather than the Exchange Act but ultimately recommends Congress amend the
definition of “security” in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (defining “security” in the Securities Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (defining “security” in the Exchange Act).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, stock, trea-
sury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of in-
debtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
. . . investment contract, . . . .”).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018).
83. See id. §§ 77f–g.  Registration forms require the company to disclose rele-
vant information including a description of the security to be offered for sale and
the company’s business, ownership, capital structure, and financial health. Id.; see
also SEC, RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SEC-
TION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO 10 (2017).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (2018).
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2. The Howey Test
In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,85 the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished a test to interpret “investment contract,” the ambiguous,
catch-all term in the Securities Act.86
In Howey, two Florida corporations were in the business of
selling, servicing, and managing orange groves.87  The corporations
offered to sell two types of contracts:  land and service.88  Under the
land contract, a purchaser would pay a price per acre in exchange
for conveyance of the land.89  However, under the service contract,
a purchaser would not pay for the land itself but rather the right to
the profits generated by the orange groves on the land.90  A pur-
chaser would have no right to market the oranges—rather, the cor-
poration would have “full discretion and authority over the
cultivation of the groves and the harvest and marketing of the
crops.”91  The Court defined an investment contract as “a contract,
transaction[,] or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the ef-
forts of the promoter or a third party . . . .”92  Applying this “Howey
test,” the Court found the service contract to be an investment con-
tract because the sellers offered the service contract to purchasers
who lacked both the knowledge and means to, themselves, care for
and make money off of the orange crops.93  The purchasers were
“attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their investment,”
and to obtain such a profit, they relied on the efforts of others.94
Though the Howey test is over 70 years old, courts today apply
the Howey test to determine whether a digital token is a security.95
This analysis is complex because a digital token itself is not necessa-
rily an investment contract, and the court must analyze the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.96  For example, a
court would likely consider a token to be an investment contract if a
85. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
86. Id. at 296–97.
87. Id. at 294–95.
88. Id. at 295.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 296–97.  Investment contracts are securities under the Securities
Act.  15 U.S.C. § 77a(1) (2018).
91. Id. at 296.
92. Id. at 298–99.
93. Id. at 296, 299.
94. Id. at 300.
95. SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-civ-9439, 2020 WL 1430035, at *9–18
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also DAO Report, supra note 4, at *8.
96. Hinman Speech, supra note 62.
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person purchased the token with the expectation of profiting off of
the token’s increase in value.97
3. The DAO Report
In July 2017, the SEC applied the Howey test to a digital token
and, in its infamous “DAO Report,” it announced that the token
was a security.98
The Decentralized Autonomous Organization99 (“DAO”) built
a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain100 to form a
crowdfund that allowed people to pitch project ideas to the DAO
community and potentially receive funding.101  Any person could
exchange Ether102 for DAO tokens that allowed token-holders to
vote on project plans and receive rewards from profitable
projects.103  In July 2017, the SEC issued the DAO Report announc-
ing that the DAO tokens were securities and those who issued them
were therefore in violation of federal securities laws.104  Such a
finding shocked the cryptocurrency industry because the industry
did not view coin offerings as securities prior to publication of the
DAO Report.105
97. DAO Report, supra note 4, at 11–12; see also id.
98. DAO Report, supra note 4, at 1.
99. While “The DAO” is the name of a particular company, the term “DAO”
refers to a company that encodes a set of rules as a smart contract and fundraises
so that it can function on its own without the “hierarchical management” of a
traditional company. What is DAO, COINTELEGRAPH, https://bit.ly/2UAi9Zm
[https://perma.cc/4X45-E37X] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).  The DAO, as referred
to in this Comment, is the name of one of such decentralized organizations. Id.
100. Ethereum is a “programmable blockchain” that allows developers to
write code to control the exchange of their cryptocurrency. See generally ETHER-
EUM, http://bit.ly/2Q9SVyO [https://perma.cc/TZZ5-QY8C] (last visited Sept. 18,
2020) (describing the ability of Ethereum users to write code on the Ethereum
blockchain, which users can access from anywhere in the world, that controls digi-
tal value and runs exactly as programmed).
101. Brian Ray, Article: Blockchain Symposium Introduction: Overview and
Historical Introduction, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 8 (2019); see also Samuel Falkon,
The Story of the DAO — Its History and Consequences, MEDIUM BLOG (Dec. 24,
2017), http://bit.ly/2PM253N [https://perma.cc/M6YT-FRLU].
102. Ether is the digital coin native to the Ethereum blockchain. What Is
Ethereum?, ETHEREUM, https://bit.ly/2Vj7f9D [https://perma.cc/UV2Y-6FDR]
(last visited Sept. 18, 2020).  For a description of the Ethereum blockchain, see
supra text accompanying note 100.
103. DAO Report, supra note 4, at *2.  Ether is a cryptocurrency that users
can purchase and exchange like money. Id.
104. Id. at *1.
105. Ray, supra note 101, at 7.  For a simplified explanation of the SEC’s find-
ings, see also Jon Buck, Forewarned Is Forearmed: Key Takeaways from SEC
DAO Report, COINTELEGRAPH (Jul. 30, 2017), http://bit.ly/390VsSF [https://
perma.cc/N25R-N8TB].
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The SEC did not file charges against The DAO, but the DAO
Report rapidly spread throughout the cryptocurrency industry and
served as notice that a digital tokens may be an investment contract
and therefore trigger the Securities Act’s registration require-
ments.106  This new distinction was significant because it meant that
any issuer of digital tokens was potentially in violation of federal
securities laws, and it forced companies pursuing future digital to-
ken projects to reconsider doing so.107
While the DAO Report was the SEC’s first step toward creat-
ing a regulatory scheme for digital tokens, the SEC carefully noted
that it had not adopted a bright-line rule for analyzing whether a
digital asset is a security.108  Commissioner Hester Peirce explained
that “the application of Howey to one particular ICO [(initial coin
offering)] does not answer every question.”109  In fact, the scope of
the DAO Report was strictly limited to The DAO tokens.110  De-
spite its limited reach, the DAO Report had a widespread impact
on the industry:  it clarified that the SEC will evaluate the facts,
circumstances, and economic realities of digital tokens on a fact-
specific, case-by-case basis.111  The SEC cautioned companies plan-
ning to issue digital tokens against making decisions based solely on
the DAO Report and advised them to seek the advice of attorneys
with expertise in federal securities laws.112
4. Framework for Analyzing Digital Assets and the TurnKey Jet
No-Action Letter
Three years later, the SEC published agency guidance entitled
“Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital As-
sets.”113  The Framework is expansive and provides an exhausting
106. DAO Report, supra note 4, at *12–14.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Statement by the Divisions of Corporation Finance and Enforcement on
the Report of Investigation on the DAO, SEC (July 25, 2017), http://bit.ly/35KOgIm
[https://perma.cc/ML5B-6Z94] (“[T]he issue of whether a particular investment op-
portunity involves the offer or sale of a security . . . depends on the facts and
circumstances, including the economic realities and structure of the enterprise.”).
109. Hester M. Peirce, Wolves and Wolverines: Remarks at the University of
Michigan Law School, SEC (Sep. 24, 2018), http://bit.ly/2Miif2v [https://perma.cc/
MRY2-KJH3].
110. See DAO Report, supra note 4, at *1.
111. Id. at 17–18.
112. Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial
Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), http://bit.ly/2Q6M2fS [http://bit.ly/2Q6M2fS]; see
also infra Part III.A.1 (describing the challenges a company faces when applying
SEC agency guidance to understand how the SEC will view a digital token offering
under federal securities laws).
113. Framework, supra note 4.
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but “not intended to be an exhaustive” list of over 30 factors that a
court will consider to decide whether a digital token is a security
under Howey.114  For example, the ability of token holders to trade
or transfer a token on the secondary market favors the conclusion
that users have a reasonable expectation of profit under Howey.115
A token whose holder can immediately use the token for its in-
tended functionality or whose issuers market the token by empha-
sizing the token’s functionality, rather than the token’s potential for
appreciation in value, is less likely to meet the Howey test.116
The Framework is problematic because its contents are not le-
gally binding on the SEC.117  The SEC merely intended the Frame-
work as “[s]taff guidance”—an “analytical tool” to evaluate digital
assets.118  While the SEC’s intention for the Framework was to
guide digital asset creators in determining if federal securities laws
apply to their digital assets,119 the Framework seems to confuse
market participants.  Instead, the Framework may more realistically
function as a guide for judges to navigate litigation120 as the Frame-
work describes the Howey test as an objective test with a focus on
the “transaction itself and the manner in which the digital asset is
offered and sold.”121
Alongside the Framework, the SEC issued its first no-action
letter regarding digital tokens to TurnKey Jet, Inc. (“TKJ”).122  A
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Hinman Speech, supra note 62.
118. Id.
119. Framework, supra note 4.
120. RECENT GUIDANCE: SECURITIES REGULATION—FINANCIAL TECHNOL-
OGY—SEC PROVIDES ANALYTICAL TOOLS FOR ASSESSING DIGITAL ASSETS.—
SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS,
132 HARV. L. REV. 2418, 2422 (2019).
121. Id.  In SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, the court denied the SEC’s motion for
injunction and found that the Commission failed to show that investors purchased
the digital assets with an expectation of making profits from the efforts of others.
SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18-cv-2287, 2018 WL 6181408, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
27, 2018).  Upon reversal, the court agreed with the SEC that the Howey test is
“unquestionably an objective one” but disagreed that the court had previously ap-
plied a subjective test.  SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2019
WL 625163 at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019).  The Framework’s emphasis on the
objectivity of the Howey test seems to directly reference the SEC’s disagreement
between the courts in Blockvest.
122. Letter from Jonathan A. Ingram, Chief Legal Advisor, Finhub, Division
of Corporate Fanance, SEC to TurnKey Jet, Inc., 2019 WL 1471132, at *1 (April 3,
2019) [hereinafter TurnKey Letter].  As of January 2020, TurnKey Jet, Inc. was the
first of only two companies to receive a no-action letter from the SEC. Id.  Pock-
etful of Quarters was the second company to receive a no-action letter.  Letter
from Jonathan A. Ingram, Chief Legal Advisor, FinHub, Division of Corporate
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no-action letter is a non-binding pledge to not pursue enforcement
action.123  A company that is unsure whether its digital token is a
security can request a no-action letter from the SEC.124
In its letter, the SEC noted particularly influential characteris-
tics of the TKJ token that aligned with the characteristics the SEC
identified in the DAO Report.125  Particular characteristics of the
TKJ tokens that favored the SEC’s conclusion that the tokens were
not securities included the following:  the tokens would be immedi-
ately usable for their intended function; TKJ would market the to-
ken’s functionality rather than potential for appreciation of value;
TKJ would sell the tokens for one dollar each; and the tokens
would represent an obligation to provide airline services.126  Con-
tingent upon TKJ retaining such characteristics, the SEC permitted
TKJ to sell its tokens.127
C. The SEC Today: A Case Comparison
1. Telegram
In 2018, a messaging app called Telegram utilized a Simple
Agreement for Future Tokens (“SAFT”) to sell to 175 original pur-
chasers mere rights to “Grams,” digital tokens that were not yet
existent or functional.128  Telegram planned to use the $1.7 billion
funds from the SAFT to finance its own blockchain, the Telegram
Open Network (“TON”), that would create a decentralized econ-
omy within the messaging app, on which users could use Grams as a
Finance, SEC, to Pocketful of Quarters, Inc. (July 25, 2019), http://bit.ly/39dcgpp
[https://perma.cc/94VR-KUML] [hereinafter Pocketful of Quarters Letter] (in-
forming Pocketful of Quarters that the Division will not recommend the SEC take
enforcement action).  Notably, George Weiksner, the owner of Pocketful of
Quarters, was only 11 years old when he developed the company.  Zoë Bernard,
This Cryptocurrency Startup with a 12-Year-Old CEO is Trying to Solve a Com-
mon Frustration Among Gamers, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2018, 8:45 AM),
http://bit.ly/2GnK9qv [https://perma.cc/2TWB-3B6N].
123. No Action Letters, SEC, http://bit.ly/2uG2WLA [https://perma.cc/BXU9-
9VW4] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).
124. Id.; see also Part III.A.1.b for more details about no-action letters.
125. TurnKey Letter, supra note 122, at *1 (noting that TKJ did not create the
expectation that purchasers would profit from the tokens); DAO Report, supra
note 4, at *9–10 (explaining that DAO tokens resembled investment contracts be-
cause DAO token purchasers reasonably expected to profit after The DAO
launched).
126. TurnKey Letter, supra note 122, at *1.
127. Id.
128. SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-civ-9439, 2020 WL 1430035, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).  Telegram asserts that “[t]he Grams themselves, as distinct from
the purchase contracts, will merely be a currency or commodity . . . .”  Answer at 3,
SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-civ-9439 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16, 2019).
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medium of exchange.129  But, to prevent Grams from implicating
federal securities laws, Telegram would wait to distribute the Grams
to purchasers until after the launch of the TON Blockchain.130  Af-
ter the launch of the TON Blockchain, Grams would constitute a
utility token rather than a security because Grams would be fully
functional on the TON Blockchain.131
Between February 2, 2018, and October 11, 2019, Telegram co-
operated with SEC investigations.132  Telegram produced thousands
of documents, submitted a legal analysis of Grams under the
Howey test, made presentations to the SEC, and communicated
with SEC attorneys through phone and email.133  When the SEC
expressed concern for a particular function of the tokens, Telegram
modified its plans.134
However, on October 11, 2019, the SEC filed a complaint
against Telegram, moved for a preliminary injunction, and obtained
a temporary restraining order to prevent Telegram from delivering
Grams to purchasers as scheduled on October 31, 2019.135  Tele-
gram agreed to delay delivering Grams to purchasers until April 30,
2020.136  Focusing on one element of the Howey test, the SEC al-
129. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-civ-9439 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Telegram Complaint].
130. The Telegram Team, A Public Notice About the TON Blockchain and
Grams, TELEGRAM BLOG (Jan. 6, 2020), http://bit.ly/2TVNt4a [https://perma.cc/
YEJ3-WTTG] (“Only once the TON Blockchain launches will Grams be created
and available to purchase [to ensure that the TON Blockchain and Grams can
operate in a way that is compliant with all relevant laws and regulations].”).
131. JUAN BATIZ-BENET, MARCO SANTORI, & JESSE CLAYBURGH, THE
SAFT PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 9 (2017) (ex-
plaining that purchasers of fully functional tokens purchase the tokens either to
use the tokens themselves for in-app consumptive purposes or sell the tokens on
the secondary market).  The latter would likely not satisfy Howey because selling
tokens on the secondary market is unlikely an expectation of profits from the ef-
forts of others. Id.
132. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike Telegram’s First Affirmative Defense 12–13, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No.
19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. 2020), 2020 WL 4282371 (describing Telegram’s ef-
forts to cooperate with SEC investigations); but see Plaintiff SEC’s Memorandum
of Law in Support of its Motion to Strike Telegram’s First Affirmative Defense
4–5, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), 2020 WL
4282376 (asserting that Telegram began communicating with the SEC only after it
informed Telegram that it was investigating Telegram’s sale of Grams).
133. Answer at 2, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (S.D.N.Y.
2020); but see Plaintiff SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to
Strike Telegram’s First Affirmative Defense, supra note 132, at 4–5.
134. Durov Dep. 161:10–19, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
135. Telegram Complaint, supra note 129, at 4.
136. SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439, 2020 WL 1430035, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. 2020); see also Anna Baydakova, Telegram Looks to Cut Deal with TON
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leged that Grams were securities because Grams purchasers in-
vested money into a common enterprise and expected to profit
from the managerial efforts of others.137  Notably, the SEC did not
provide a full analysis of Grams under the Howey test until it filed
its brief in support of motion for summary judgment.138
On March 24, 2020, the court granted the SEC’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, which prevented Telegram from distributing
Grams until litigation concluded.139  “[Having examined] the total-
ity of the evidence and consider[ed] the economic realities . . . ,” the
court found that the SEC met its burden of showing a substantial
likelihood of success in proving that the transaction between Tele-
gram and the initial purchasers constituted a sale of securities.140
The court disregarded the form of the exchange and determined
that the substance of the exchange was a security sale—despite the
delayed Grams distribution under the SAFT and the warranties in
the Purchase Agreements that consumers were “purchasing the to-
kens for [their] own account and not with a view towards, or for
resale in connection with, the sale or distribution.”141  In light of the
court’s decision, Telegram notified its purchasers on April 30, 2020
that it would not issue Grams, and it provided purchasers with re-
payment options.142  Telegram appealed the District Court’s deci-
sion to the Second Circuit, which is significant because a circuit
court has never decided an issue regarding an ICO, but then later
withdrew its appeal.143
Two months later, Telegram announced that it had abandoned
the blockchain platform.144  A mere two and a half weeks after that,
a Chinese company announced it would launch its own version of
Blockchain Investors After SEC Order, COINDESK (Oct. 16, 2019, 10:22 PM),
https://bit.ly/2U7vmYu [https://perma.cc/VD34-78L5] (quoting Telegram’s letter to
Gram purchasers).
137. Telegram Complaint, supra note 129, at 15–25.
138. Plaintiff SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment at 22–26, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (S.D.N.Y.
2020), ECF 70, 2020 WL 863548.
139. SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439, 2020 WL 1430035, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
140. Id. at *18.
141. Id. at *20.
142.  [Andrey Kolesnikov], Telegram Open Net-
work  [Letter to Telegram Open Network to in-
vestors. 2 options available], SMART-LAB (April 30, 2020, 5:36 AM), https://bit.ly/
2VmfhyQ [https://perma.cc/SCS7-QZUP].
143. Notice of Appeal, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-civ-9439 (S.D.N.Y.
2020).
144. Pavel Durov, What Was TON and Why It Is Over, https://bit.ly/3gILUiY
[https://perma.cc/NG9F-P8LT] (May 12, 2020) (“I am writing this post to officially
announce that Telegram’s active involvement with TON is over.”).
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Telegram’s blockchain on its own platform, independent from that
of Telegram.145  While Telegram advised Grams purchasers to not
trust third-party sites that use Telegram’s brand or blockchain, Tele-
gram remains optimistic that the United States will one day obtain
“decentralization, balance[,] and equality” as other countries
have.146
2. Block.one
Block.one is a Cayman Islands-registered technology company
that raised several billion dollars by selling 900 million digital to-
kens through an ICO.147  Despite Block.one’s efforts to not sell to-
kens to U.S. citizens,148 U.S. citizens managed to purchase them.149
The SEC commenced an enforcement action against Block.one and
opined that the tokens were securities under the federal securities
laws based on Howey and the DAO Report.150
Unlike Telegram, Block.one settled with the SEC.151  The SEC
imposed a civil penalty on Block.one amounting to only a small per-
centage of the total capital from its token sale152 and did not re-
quire Block.one to admit or deny the SEC’s findings that its tokens
145. Robert Stevens, Chinese TON Community to Launch Telegram’s Aban-
doned Crypto Project, DECRYPT (May 29, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Mjsi78 [https://
perma.cc/P38R-3BCM]; see also infra note 169 (expressing concern that the United
States’s lack of regulatory clarity will cause the United States to fall behind in the
financial technology industry).
146. Durov, supra note 144.
147. Block.one, Securities Act Release No. 10714, 2019 WL 4793292, at *1–2
(Sept. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Block.one Settlement].
148. Block.one’s exclusion of Americans from purchasing its tokens illustrates
how U.S. securities laws encourage innovators to relocate outside of the United
States. See infra note 169 (expressing concern that the United States’s regulatory
unclarity will cause it to fall behind in the financial technology industry).
149. Block.one Settlement, supra note 147, at *2.
150. Id. at *1.  The SEC did not incorporate the “common enterprise” ele-
ment of the Howey test into its analysis. Id.
151. SEC Orders Blockchain Company to Pay $24 Million Penalty for Unre-
gistered ICO, SEC (Sept. 30, 2019), http://bit.ly/2TY33fK [https://perma.cc/595B-
9LWH].
152. See Block.one Settlement, supra note 147, at *5 (ordering Block.one to
pay a civil penalty of $24 million); see also Robert Rosenblum, Amy Caiazza, &
Taylor Evenson, Less Aggressive SEC Sanctions on Violations by Crypto Issuers,
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, https://bit.ly/3aaXMYd [https://
perma.cc/BM8U-P5VG] (Oct. 26, 2019).
[T]he SEC imposed only a $24 million penalty, which is less than 0.6% of
the total amount Block.one raised.  By contrast, in prior proceedings
against token issuers that illegally sold unregistered tokens, the SEC im-
posed penalties of 1.67% and 2.07% of total amounts raised and/or
agreed to additional undertakings that, in the aggregate, imposed more
significant consequences on the issuer.
Id.
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were securities.153  Moreover, the SEC did not impose bad actor
disqualifications under Regulation A and Regulation D and did not
require Block.one to make a rescission offer to U.S. investors or
register the tokens under the Exchange Act.154
III. ANALYSIS
A. Issuing Digital Tokens: A Costly Gamble
1. The Perils of Regulation by Enforcement
Companies do not receive clear guidance from the SEC to un-
derstand the securities registration requirements as applied to digi-
tal tokens.155  Rather than issuing a binding agency rule, the SEC
creates digital token policies through enforcement actions on a
case-by-case basis.156  This method of policymaking makes it very
difficult for a company to predict the SEC’s response to a com-
pany’s digital token sale.157  Because of this regulatory uncertainty,
companies choosing to issue digital tokens face a high-stakes deci-
sion between two risky choices:  move forward and issue the digital
token or petition the SEC for a no-action letter before issuing the
token.158  Both options yield significant risks that could severely im-
153. Block.one Settlement, supra note 147, at *1 (ordering Block.one to pay a
civil penalty of $24 million).
154. Id. at *5. See also Rosenblum, supra note 152 (comparing the SEC’s
mild sanctions on Block.one to the SEC’s more serious sanctions on other digital
token issuers).
155. See DAO Report, supra note 4; Framework, supra note 4; SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
156. The perils of regulation through enforcement are perhaps best exempli-
fied by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). See, e.g., Todd
Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 921–23 (2018) (criticizing regulation by enforcement as lack-
ing in due process protections); Matt Levine, Rules Make for Better Rules Than
Lawsuits Do, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan 30, 2018, 2:00 am), https://bloom.bg/
3ahq8yQ (same), but see, e.g., Brief for Current and Former Members of Congress
as Amici Curiae at 17–18, Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7 (U.S.
argued Mar. 3, 2020) (arguing that the CFPB’s ability to act quickly through en-
forcement makes the agency better equipped to protect consumers); Kate Berry,
CFPB’s Cordray Defends Agency’s Enforcement Actions, AM. BANKER (Mar. 31,
2017, 11:33 am), https://bit.ly/2VxToxe [https://perma.cc/EP8C-F7N9] (“[Former
CFPB Director Richard] Cordray said that when a company is hit with an enforce-
ment action, other companies in similar situations are put on notice that they could
be violating the law if they are acting in the same way.”).
157. See supra Part II.C (discussing the disparity between the SEC’s response
to two different companies’ unregistered token sales).
158. See, e.g., Letter from Lewis Rinaudo Cohen, Counsel for Pocketful of
Quarters, Inc., to Off. of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC (July
25, 2019), http://bit.ly/32BPR2B [https://perma.cc/J7XM-4BAJ] [hereinafter In-
coming Pocketful of Quarters Letter] (requesting a no-action letter from the SEC).
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pact the company’s financial health.159  Uncertainty is a risk com-
mon to both options and will continue to be a problem until
regulators and legislators change their approach to regulating digi-
tal assets.160
a. Option One: Issue the Digital Token161
If a company feels confident enough that its token is not a se-
curity under Howey, then the company will not register its tokens
before selling them.162  Doing so allows the company to proceed
with new technology projects without immediately drawing the
SEC’s attention to the token sale,163 but it creates uncertainty re-
garding the company’s future.164  A company in this position can be
sure of only one thing:  if the SEC perceives the company to have
issued an unregistered security, then the SEC will commence en-
forcement action.165
The SEC “appropriately tailor[s]”166 its enforcement sanctions
to further its goals of deterrence and protection of market partici-
159. See, e.g., Block.one Settlement, supra note 147, at *5 (ordering Block.one
to pay a civil penalty of $24 million). See also Robert Stevens, The SEC Killed
Telegram’s $1.7B Crypto Project. Who’s Next?, DECRYPT (May 13, 2020), https://
bit.ly/2WUdAcn [https://perma.cc/T6K9-YZM8] (describing ongoing litigation be-
tween Kik and the SEC in which the SEC alleges that Kik’s ICO cryptocurrency
project, Kin, amounted to a sale of unregistered securities).  “[T]he court case has
crippled [Kik], costing over $6 million so far and forcing Kik to split from Kin and
sell off its chat app.”  Id.
160. See Part III.B (suggesting an alternative to the current securities laws
that would minimize the potentially detrimental effects of uncertainty).
161. Alternatively, the company could attempt to issue the digital token
pursuant to an exemption from registration—Regulation A or Regulation D. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263, .500–.508 (2019).
162. C.f. Brief for Defendant at 1, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 1:19-cv-
5244 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020) (alleging that Kik’s tokens were not securities, and the
SEC “twist[ed]” and mischaracterized the facts).
163. Even so, it is unrealistic to expect a company to be able to stay under the
radar for long.  Telegram began selling rights to Grams in January 2018, and the
SEC contacted Telegram by February 2018.  SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19
Civ. 9439, 2020 WL 1430035, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020).
164. For an example of a company getting blindsided by an enforcement ac-
tion, see Complaint at 48–49, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 1:19-cv-5244
(S.D.N.Y.) (seeking to “permanently restrain[ ] and enjoin[ ] . . . Kik . . . from . . .
violating . . . the Securities Act”).
165. See, e.g., Order, Securities Act Release No. 33-10755, 2020 WL 821462
(Feb. 19, 2020) (entering a settlement between the SEC and Enigma MPC); Litiga-
tion Release, Securities Act Release No. 24723, 2020 WL 359633 (Jan. 21, 2020)
(describing the SEC’s enforcement action against Sergii “Sergey” Grybniak and
his company, Opporty International, Inc., for an offering of unregistered digital
tokens); Block.one, Securities Act Release No. 10714, 2019 WL 4793292 (Sept. 30,
2019) (settling with Block.one).
166. SEC DIV. OF ENF’T ANN. REP. 18 (2019).
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pants from potential future misconduct.167  However, the SEC’s
current trend of policymaking by enforcement actions is ineffective
at deterring bad behavior and protecting investors.168
The SEC’s unpredictable response to digital tokens unnecessa-
rily deters potential token issuers and stifles innovation within the
U.S.169  Fear that the SEC will view a company’s token as a security
drives companies out of the U.S. and causes them to spearhead
their digital token projects in other countries that have more so-
phisticated and predictable regulations.170
Inconsistent enforcement is another undesirable consequence
of using enforcement actions to create policy.171  For example, the
SEC sanctioned two different companies for registration violations:
Block.one and Telegram.172  Despite similarities between the two
cases, the SEC’s penalty for Telegram was much more severe than
that for Block.one.173
In what appears to be another attempt to encourage settle-
ment, the SEC chose to not impose a civil penalty upon Gladius
Network, LLC, which self-reported its unregistered token offering
and cooperated with related investigations.174  Despite Gladius Net-
work, LLC’s success in avoiding a civil penalty, a company, in gen-
167. Id. at 5.
168. See Part III.B.
169. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC, Renegade Pandas: Opportunities
for Cross Border Cooperation in Regulation of Digital Assets (July 30, 2019)
[hereinafter Commissioner Peirce, Digital Assets] (expressing “concern that the
U.S. will fall behind other countries in attracting crypto-related businesses unless
[the U.S. is] more forward-leaning in establishing a regulatory regime with discern-
ible parameters”).
170. See id.; see also Part II.C.2 (illustrating an example of a company that
started its digital token project in another country and made efforts to prevent
U.S. involvement).
171. See, c.f. Part II.C (distinguishing between the results of two different
SEC enforcement actions).
172. See Part II.C.
173. See Part II.C; Block.one Settlement, supra note 147, at *1.  The compa-
nies’ differences in cooperation may explain such a contrast:  Telegram forcefully
committed to pushing back against the SEC in court; whereas, Block.one agreed to
settle. Id.; Final Judgment as to Defendants Telegram Group Inc. and TON Issuer
Inc., SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439, 3–4 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), ECF 70
(ordering Telegram to pay $1.2 billion back to investors and pay an $18.5 million
dollar civil penalty to the SEC).  However, even if this fully explained SEC’s con-
trasting penalties, the SEC’s enforcement procedure remains problematic.  A pol-
icy of rewarding a company that displays willingness to settle and punishing a
company that will take the SEC to court bullies companies into settling with the
SEC, when they otherwise may have been successful, ensuring an empty field of
caselaw surrounding digital token offerings. Infra Part III.A.1.a.
174. Gladius Network LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10608, 2019 WL
697993, at *5 (Feb. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Gladius Settlement].
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-1\DIK107.txt unknown Seq: 24 28-SEP-20 14:24
276 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:253
eral, would be unwise to self-report a violation if it is uncertain that
it has indeed broken the law.175  Doing so would draw the SEC’s
attention to the company’s potentially legal sale of digital tokens
and affirmatively suggest that the company believes it violated re-
gistration requirements and that remedial action is warranted.176
Through its favorable treatment of self-reporters, the SEC ex-
presses its preference for cooperation and leaves companies with
little choice but to enter into a settlement agreement with the
SEC.177  Consequently, the SEC may perceive issuing a digital to-
ken without first seeking a no-action letter as uncooperative and
invoke more serious consequences for a company that chooses such
an option.
While encouraging companies to forego litigation saves time
and resources, settlement forecloses the opportunity to develop
case law and perpetuates the lack of regulatory clarity within the
industry.178  Sparse case law,179 in conjunction with high stakes, co-
erces companies to enter settlement agreements when a trial, while
175. Even if a company is certain of a violation, a company would be unwise
to admit to facts that demonstrate a violation of federal securities laws as part of a
settlement with the SEC because the Department of Justice may use this admission
as evidence to prosecute the company in a parallel proceeding. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2) (“An Opposing Party’s Statement.  [A] statement [that] is offered
against an opposing party . . . [is not hearsay].”).  It may be more strategic to lose
at trial than to admit facts in a settlement agreement because loss of a civil lawsuit
will have no evidentiary use in a subsequent criminal trial. FED. R. EVID. 403
(“The court may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following:  unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury . . . .”).  While the prosecutor’s burden of proof in a criminal
prosecution is often “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the burden of proof in a civil
lawsuit is “preponderance of evidence.” JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY
KANE, & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 658 (5th ed. 2015).  Therefore, a
Rule 403 objection would likely succeed if the Department of Justice sought to
present evidence of a lost civil lawsuit to prove guilt in a criminal prosecution. Id.
Similarly, while the court in a criminal proceeding cannot draw an adverse infer-
ence from a company’s assertion of its Fifth Amendment privilege, the court is free
to do so in a civil proceeding. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 118 (2020).
176. Gladius Settlement, supra note 174, at *2.  A company that reports itself
invites the SEC to begin its investigation with the understanding that the self-re-
porting company thinks it violated the law.  The SEC’s perspective going into the
investigation may bias the outcome of its investigation and lead to a finding unfa-
vorable to the self-reporting company.  For this reason, self-reporting, though en-
couraged by the SEC, may be an unwise choice for a company.
177. See, e.g., News Release, Exchange Act, 2019 WL 696830 (quoting Robert
A. Cohen, Chief of the SEC’s Cyber Unit:  “‘Today’s case shows the benefit of
self-reporting and taking proactive steps to remediate unregistered offerings’”).
178. Very few companies against whom the SEC took enforcement action
have taken the issue to court. See, e.g., Status Report at 2, SEC v. Kik Interactive
Inc., No. 1:19-cv-5244 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020), ECF 43 (requesting that the court
set a trial date); c.f. supra note 173 (describing how the SEC may encourage
settlement).
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still risky, could ultimately be more beneficial to the company—a
vicious cycle that will be broken only by legislative and agency
intervention.180
b. Option Two: Petition the SEC for a No-Action Letter
Petitioning the SEC for a no-action letter shows the SEC that a
company is acting in good faith and willing to disclose its company
practices.181  The SEC’s response to a company’s request for a no-
action letter will provide valuable insight regarding the SEC’s
stance on its proposed token sale that the company would other-
wise obtain only through litigation.182  Receipt of a no-action letter
is an ideal outcome for a company wishing to issue digital tokens
because the company will be free to sell its digital tokens with low
risk of an SEC enforcement action.183  To persuade the SEC to is-
sue a no-action letter, a company can analogize to other companies’
token sales that have been granted—or not granted—no-action let-
ters.184  However, the probability of receiving a no-action letter is
low given that the SEC has issued only two letters in the digital
token space.185  The SEC’s’ ability to change its position found in
previous no-action letters further decreases a company’s likelihood
of success.186
179. For example, the SEC had not provided a complete analysis of digital
tokens under Howey until it motioned for summary judgment in SEC v. Telegram
Grp. Inc. Brief for Plaintiff at 22–25, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439
(PKC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020), ECF 79 (discussing ambiguity among district
courts with respect to analyzing Howey).
180. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (describing the evidentiary
danger of admitting violation of securities laws).
181. Gladius Settlement, supra note 174, at *5 (explaining that the SEC did
not impose civil penalties against Gladius because it was cooperative with investi-
gations); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text for a definition of a no-
action letter.
182. See TurnKey Letter, supra note 122; Pocketful of Quarters Letter, supra
note 122; Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 22–25,
SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020), ECF
79.
183. Such a token sale is not completely free from the risk of an enforcement
action because a no-action letter does not create binding precedent as the SEC can
later change its position after sending a no-action letter. No Action Letters, SEC,
http://bit.ly/2uG2WLA [https://perma.cc/VE7Y-MWVH] (last visited Sept. 18,
2020).
184. Incoming Pocketful of Quarters Letter, supra note 158, at 13.  Analogiz-
ing to the facts of other companies’ token sales shows that the industry treats no-
action letters the same as it would treat binding agency precedent.
185. TurnKey Letter, supra note 122; Incoming Pocketful of Quarters Letter,
supra note 158.
186. No Action Letters, SEC, http://bit.ly/2uG2WLA [https://perma.cc/VE7Y-
MWVH] (last visited Sept. 18, 2020).  The agency may change or erase its no-
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Further, creating policy through no-action letters prohibits
public participation and sidesteps commitment and accountabil-
ity.187  Because cryptocurrency is a highly technical subject, the
SEC would greatly benefit from receiving public comments and in-
dustry experts’ contributions to the rulemaking process.188  The Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) requires agency notice and
comment procedures for this very reason, which the SEC’s back-
door method of rulemaking undermines.189  This would not be so if
the SEC were using its no-action letters merely to interpret the law
or a previously adopted agency rule.190  However, the SEC has pre-
viously gone beyond rule interpretation by creating new substantive
rules and revising existing statutes through no-action letters.191
B. A Regulatory Framework that Removes Uncertainty,
Encourages Innovation, and Protects Market Participants
1. Modify and Codify Howey
In the absence of statutory guidance that specifically addresses
digital assets, the SEC takes Howey’s position:  securities laws con-
trol any activity that involves an “investment of money in a com-
mon enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.”192  While the SEC has suggested that federal securities laws
do not govern decentralized digital tokens,193 one could reasonably
interpret Howey’s ambiguous “efforts of others” language to en-
action letter position at any time because no-action letters are not binding author-
ity to the agency. Id. A company that analogizes to companies who have been
granted or denied no-action letters will be unsuccessful if the SEC changes its posi-
tion on such previously granted or denied no-action letters. See id.
187. See id. (explaining that the SEC may change its positions in no-action
letters at any time); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (illustrating a rulemaking procedure that
requires public participation and holds the agency accountable to the public).
188. Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC, Running on Empty: A Proposal
to Fill the Gap Between Regulation and Decentralization, Appendix (Feb. 6, 2020)
[hereinafter Peirce Proposal Appendix] (urging public participation and comment
on Commissioner Peirce’s digital token safe harbor proposal).
189. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2018).
190. Id. § 553(b)(A).
191. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC
No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 921, 961–63 (1998) (describing that the SEC has announced binding substan-
tive law “in the guise of regulatory interpretations in no-action letters”).
192. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (emphasis added).
193. Hinman Speech, supra note 62 (“If the network on which the token or
coin is to function is sufficiently decentralized—where purchasers would no longer
reasonably expect a person or group to carry out essential managerial or en-
trepreneurial efforts—the assets may not represent an investment contract.”); see
also Part II.A.2. (describing a decentralized network as one that functions on its
own without a central authority).
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compass efforts of the decentralized network itself.  In Howey, the
“efforts of others” were the corporation’s efforts to cultivate the
orange crops.194  Regarding digital assets, one could reasonably
construe the “efforts of others” as the blockchain’s efforts to man-
age purchasers’ investments.
This view illustrates the critical need to distinguish between ef-
forts of others under Howey and efforts of the network.  If efforts of
the decentralized network did indeed equal “efforts of others”
under Howey, then a decentralized token would nonetheless be a
security under Howey, contrary to the SEC’s current stance.195
To achieve regulatory clarity and consistency, a necessary first
step is for Congress or the SEC to codify the distinction between
efforts of others and efforts of the network.  Instead of policymaking
via enforcement actions, no-action letters, and litigation,196 the SEC
or Congress should codify a version of the Howey test that draws
the line between a decentralized network and a network that de-
pends on the managerial efforts of others.  One way that regulators
and legislators could create this distinction is by narrowing the term
“others” to include only persons and groups of persons.197  A
blockchain is not a person; it is impossible for a person to manage
any blockchain, and there is no central access point to any
blockchain.198  This distinction is essential because if “others” in-
cludes only “persons, and “groups of persons,” then a blockchain
will never meet the Howey test as it does not depend on the mana-
gerial efforts of persons or groups of persons.  The Howey test,
without a distinction of this nature, is inadequate to evaluate
whether a digital asset is an investment contract.199
194. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300 (“A common enterprise managed by respondents
or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is therefore essential if the
investors are to achieve their paramount aim of a return on their investments.”).
195. Id. at 301 (1946).
196. See Part III.A.1.
197. Narrowing the term “others” to include only “persons” and “groups of
persons” ensures that the term “others” includes corporations and unincorporated
entities.  Efforts of the blockchain must be distinguished from efforts of persons,
corporations, and unincorporated entities, which are traditional categories of man-
agers under Howey.
198. See Part II.A.3.a.
199. Notably, William Hinman, Director of the SEC Division of Corporation
Finance, has distinguished between the following:
[A] person or coordinated group (including ‘any unincorporated organi-
zation’) that is working actively to develop or guide the development of
the infrastructure of the network . . . [and] multiple, independent actors
work[ing] on the network but no individual actor’s or coordinated group
of actors’ efforts are essential efforts that affect the failure or success of
the enterprise.
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Congress could more clearly create this distinction by amend-
ing and creating statutory definitions.  It should:  1) amend the Se-
curities Act and Exchange Act’s definition of “security” to exclude
digital tokens; and 2) define “digital token” in such a manner that
incorporates decentralization.200  The following is one example of
an appropriate definition of “digital token.”  This definition incor-
porates the decentralization and immutability elements of
blockchain as it requires the recording of transaction history on a
decentralized, immutable ledger.201  Additionally, it forecloses a
digital token from representing a financial interest in a company,
which is a traditional characteristic of a security:
A token is a digital representation of value or rights
(i)  that has a transaction history that:
(A)  is recorded on a distributed ledger, blockchain, or other dig-
ital data structure;
(B)  has transactions confirmed through an independently verifi-
able process; and
(C)  resists modification or tampering of the transaction;
(ii)  that is capable of being transferred between persons without
an intermediary party; and
(iii)  that does not represent a financial interest in a company,
partnership, or fund, including an ownership or debt interest, rev-
enue share, entitlement to any interest or dividend payment.202
2. Adopt a Grace Period
Only once regulators have codified the legal distinction be-
tween “efforts of others” and “efforts of the network” should regu-
lators address a second challenge:  the regulatory Catch 22.203  At
Hinman Speech, supra note 62, n.3.  Director Hinman distinguishes between the
extent of managerial efforts, while this Comment’s author distinguishes between
types of actors performing managerial efforts. See id.  This Comment’s author
does not promote one method of distinction over the other but cites the Hinman
Speech to illustrate a need to further clarify the Howey test.
200. See Token Taxonomy Act of 2019, H.B. 2144, 116th Cong. §2(a) (2019)
(proposing to define “security” and “digital token” under the Securities Act of
1933).
201. Id.
202. Peirce Proposal Appendix, supra note 188.  The Token Act includes a
similar definition and would also appropriately codify the distinction between
Howey’s “managerial efforts of others” and the efforts of the decentralized net-
work.  Token Taxonomy Act of 2019, H.B. 2144, 116th Cong. §2(a) (2019).
203. Commissioner Peirce, Digital Assets, supra note 169.  The grace period
policy centers around the issue of whether a digital token is fully decentralized.
See id. Without codifying the “modified Howey test,” there would still be a ques-
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inception, digital tokens are almost never completely decentral-
ized—it takes time for the network to be able to function on its
own.204  For this reason, the current law terminates a digital token
project before it can even begin.  In order for a digital token to
mature to the point where the SEC will not view it as a security,
token issuers must be able to sell the token to marketplace
participants.205
The current law prohibits the sale and exchange of unregis-
tered securities and strips digital tokens of any opportunity to ma-
ture to the point that they will not implicate securities laws.206
Because digital tokens immediately resemble securities and, under
current law, have no occasion to become fully decentralized—as
they are designed to be—the financial technology industry has
reached a deadlock.  To simultaneously overcome this deadlock and
protect token purchasers, the SEC should adopt a rule that grants
digital token developers time for the digital tokens to reach com-
plete decentralization, during which token issuers must publish key
information to consumers.  This policy would limit the SEC’s ability
to evaluate whether the tokens are securities until only after the
grace period has elapsed and would alleviate the high-stakes gam-
ble that currently discourages innovators from creating and selling
digital tokens.207
IV. CONCLUSION
The Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934 require companies to provide investors with important infor-
mation about their business operations so that investors can make
informed investment decisions.208  Similarly, the SEC should pro-
vide companies with important and binding information about SEC
enforcement decision-making so that companies can make in-
formed decisions about how to proceed with issuing digital
tokens.209
This Comment has illustrated that piecemeal rulemaking by
enforcement action has created uncertainty and inconsistent out-
tion as to whether a fully decentralized digital token is a security.  Thus, to not
render the grace period useless, regulators should codify the “modified Howey
test” before enacting the grace period.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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208. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2018); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–qq (2018).
209. See Part III.A.1.
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comes and curbed innovation of financial technology.210  Congress
and the SEC have before them a significant opportunity to use their
legislative powers to clarify the regulatory scheme for digital assets,
encourage financial technology innovation, and expand the U.S.
economy.211  Two steps would achieve these three aims.  First, an
amendment to exclude digital tokens from the statutory definition
of a security would remove doubt and uncertainty.  Such legislation
or rulemaking would put the industry on notice that, under binding
law, a fully decentralized digital token will not implicate federal se-
curities laws.  Second, building a grace period into enforcement
procedure would provide blockchain projects with an opportunity
to fully decentralize before regulators consider whether a digital to-
ken is a security.  Together, these two relatively minor changes will
adapt the 70-year-old Howey test to new financial technology—a
grand win for our legal system, economy, and our financial technol-
ogy industry.
210. See Part III.A.
211. See Part III.A.
